Tocqueville's initial statement of his views concerning issues with which he was to deal throughout his career, such as the political roles of religion and of intellectuals, and the relation of theory to practice. Not only does the book serve as a useful introduction to Tocqueville's views, however; more importantly, it helps to answer various questions to which Tocqueville's later, better-known works do not fully respond. In particular, The Penitentiary System offers us a thoughtful presentation of Tocqueville's analysis of the problems and prospects of democratic reformism -the practical expression of the democratic belief in human perfectibility.
In view of the claims that I make for the work, the relative oblivion into which it has been cast by political theorists, and specifically by Tocqueville scholars,' may be a matter of some surprise. Two reasons account for the lack of attention paid the work. First, the main text of the book was written not by Tocqueville himself, but instead by Gustave de Beaumont, Tocqueville's close friend and companion on his voyage to America; Tocqueville's own contribution was limited to the notes and appendices (Drescher 1968: 130-31) . Secondly, I believe that scholars have assumed that a book about penitentiaries must be narrowly technical, perhaps of interest to penologists, but at any rate devoid of material relevant to Tocqueville's serious concern, the study of democracy.
With regard to the first reason, one can observe that Tocqueville's notes and appendices consisted of more than two hundred pages, and have with reason been described as &dquo;a small encyclopedia of information and surprises&dquo; (Pierson 1938: 705 Boesche, 1980 (the only article on Tocqueville's study of (Wilson 1983: 163); thus a Tocqueville scholar, even while defending the importance of Tocqueville's interest in the penitentiary, acknowledges that it seems to be a &dquo;modest and anachronistic&dquo; &dquo;corner of Tocqueville's thought&dquo; (Boesche 1980: 550 There are obvious similarities between the Auburn and Philadelphia systems, which were based on common principles -convict labor and the isolation of the convicts from one another -that were differently implemented (Penitentiary 56). The chief difference between the two systems followed from the fact that isolation in the Philadelphia penitentiary was continuous, in that prisoners were incarcerated in individual cells day and night; hence the prisoners were restricted to occupations that isolated individuals could pursue, i.e., those for which cooperative labor was unnecessary (Drescher, 1968, pp. 73-76 (Pierson 1938: 712) ; (2) their growing conviction that in practice isolation could not be maintained in Auburn-style penitentiaries (Drescher 1968: 136-37) ; (3) The convict's &dquo;religious faith&dquo; is &dquo;neither lively nor deep&dquo;; religion &dquo;has not touched his heart,&dquo; but it has influenced his &dquo;mind,&dquo; which &dquo;has contracted habits of order.&dquo; It is clear from Democracy in America that this pragmatic, rationalistic acceptance of religion is characteristic of Americans generally: &dquo;it would seem that the head rather than the heart leads them to the foot of the altar.&dquo; Americans &dquo;practice their religion out of self-interest,&dquo; and &dquo;often ... place in this world the interest which they have in practicing it&dquo; (Democracy 530; see also 436, 448, 529) . In America generally as in the American penitentiary specifically, religion fails on the whole to produce an other-worldly state of mind; it is nevertheless indispensable, because it produces habits of orderliness and reliability that are so conducive to success in this world. Tocqueville's description of &dquo;preachers in America&dquo; fits him as well as it does them: &dquo;it is often difficult to be sure when listening to them [as it is when reading him] whether the main object of religion is to procure eternal felicity in the next world or prosperity in this&dquo; (Democracy 530).
Religion can influence convicts as it does ordinary Americans: it can encourage them to be orderly, to restrain (although not to abolish) their acquisitiveness, to abandon the pursuit of instantaneous gratification, and to accept the lesser but legal pleasure of deferred gratification in its stead. In general, Beaumont and Tocqueville's realistic reform &dquo;of the second grade&dquo; was intended to produce nothing more (but also not much less) than the ordinary democratic human beings whose prosaic, unromantic qualities are so well described by Tocqueville in Democracy in America. The reformed convict is characterized by &dquo;honest habits,&dquo; and a &dquo;morality ... of interest.&dquo; He is ' judicious,&dquo; he &dquo;knows how to work,&dquo; he &dquo;detest [s] crime.&dquo; In all of these respects he is strongly reminiscent of democratic man, who is concerned &dquo;to produce well-being,&dquo; who is characterized by &dquo;reason&dquo; (not &dquo;genius&dquo;), &dquo;tranquil habits&dquo; (not &dquo;heroic virtues&dquo;), andmost significantly -by &dquo;vices&dquo; (not &dquo;crimes&dquo;), by &dquo;few transgressions&dquo; (if also by &dquo;few splendid deeds&dquo;) (Democracy 245 Drawing on Tocqueville's analyses in Democracy, we can see that, in addition to benefiting society and the prisoners, the reformers' activity also helped to improve and perfect themselves: this is not the least laudable aspect of their activity in Tocqueville's view. For Tocqueville praises cooperative reformist activity not only (or perhaps even primarily) for its impact upon society; he also praises it for its impact upon the activists themselves. &dquo;It is incontestible that the people often manage public affairs very badly, but their concern therewith is bound to extend their mental horizon and shake them out of the rut of ordinary routine&dquo; . Tocqueville defends cooperative activity because it reforms those who engage in it: it broadens their horizons by causing them to consider others as well as themselves. &dquo;Feelings and ideas are renewed, the heart enlarged, and the understanding developed only by the reciprocal action of men one upon another&dquo; (Democracy 515; see also 512-13). These discussions in Democracy of the benefits that accrue to cooperative activists as a result of their activity apply to the reformers described in Penitentiary -in part because they presumably reflect Tocqueville's experiences with them and with similar reformers.
In short, The Penitentiary System presents us with two alternative images of democratic men: the convicts, the isolated materialists within the penitentiary, and the reformers, the cooperative idealists outside it. Beaumont and Tocqueville criticize the reformers for exaggerating the extent to which the convicts can be perfected; but they also praise the reformers for exemplifying the extent to which cooperative idealists can perfect themselves. Beaumont and Tocqueville are far from oblivious to the element of truth in the contention by Banfield (1974: 275) , that &dquo;the reformer wants to improve the situation of the poor... , not so much to make them better off materially as to make himself and the whole society better off morally&dquo;; but their work also suggests a sense in which Banfield's statement confers praise as well as blame upon reformers.
